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Telecommunications Regulators and Competition Agencies: Their Institutional Setting in Spain, the UK and France

Paloma Szerman

Without effective institutional engineering, regulation and competition law substantive issues are doomed to failure. Thus, discussing the advantages and disadvantages of regulatory oversight and antitrust action to determine the most balanced interplay and roles for telecommunications-specific regulation and economic-wide competition law is mandatory for every policy-maker. To deal with this interplay, each State has determined its own institutional design and legal framework, influenced by its legal traditions and political context in the now liberalized market. Three approaches for the allocation of responsibilities can be derived from different experiences around the world. This article analyses the experiences of Spain, the UK and France, with the objective of inquiring into the trade-offs between each of these models through their concrete application and derive on some of the various factors policy-makers and government officials must bear in mind when planning the institutional regulatory and competition domestic governance.

Law Graduate from the University of Buenos Aires (Argentina). This article is a version of a research paper written in the framework of the Antitrust: International and Comparative Seminar in NYU School of Law 2014 Fall Semester, dictated by Profs. Eleanor Fox and Fréderic Jenny. The author wishes to thank them for their comments, suggestions and advice during the preparation of this paper. All ideas and opinions expressed herein are to be attributed exclusively to the author of this paper. Please feel free to refer any comments or suggestions to


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